**NOVARTIS CORP** Form DFAN14A March 20, 2006

#### UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549

#### **SCHEDULE 14A**

Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Filed by the Registrant O

Filed by a Party other than the Registrant  $\circ$ 

Check the appropriate box:

Preliminary Proxy Statement

Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))

**Definitive Proxy Statement** o ý Definitive Additional Materials

Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12 o

#### CHIRON CORPORATION

(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

#### NOVARTIS CORPORATION

(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)			
Payment of Filir ý o	ng Fee (Check the appropriate box):  No fee required.  Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rul	les 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.	
	(1)	Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:	
	(2)	Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:	
	(3)	Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):	
	(4)	Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:	
	(5)	Total fee paid:	
0 0	Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.  Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.  (1) Amount Previously Paid:		

(2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:

Filing Party: (3)

(4) Date Filed:

> Persons who are to respond to the collection of information contained in this form are not required to respond unless the form displays a currently valid OMB control number.

# Searchable text section of graphics shown above

# **Presentation to Shareholders Regarding**

[LOGO]

## Agenda

#### Introduction

An Opportunity for Growth but Not Without Risks

\$45 Per Share is a Full Value for Chiron

# Until Recently, Novartis Has Been a Long-term Financial Investor in Chiron

#### Passive Investor

1994	Ciba-Geigy enters into strategic partnership with Chiron Increase existing 4.3% stake to 49.9% Contribution of diagnostics business (8.3%) \$1.4bn purchase of shares (37.3%) Enters into Governance Agreement
1996	Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merge to form Novartis Limited strategic interaction with Chiron
2000	Chiron acquires PathoGenesis, a Seattle-based biotech company for \$700 million
2003	Chiron acquires PowderJect, a U.Kbased vaccines company for \$881 million
2004	Chiron s license to manufacture at the Liverpool facility suspended
2005	Chiron independent directors reject Novartis \$40 per share offer to acquire the remaining stake in Chiron and unanimously approve Novartis revised \$45 per share offer

# The Transaction Merits Need to Be Seen Together with Chiron s Challenges and Risks

Novartis transaction rationale	Chiron s challenges and risks
Strategic platform in vaccines	Strategically overstretched underinvestment in Vaccines
Blood Testing business provides a potential basis to be extended into personalized medicine	High risk, early stage pipeline in Biopharma
Detectible interesting and account	Flu vaccine manufacturing: Remediation ongoing
Potentially interesting early stage oncology assets  Preserve value of existing 44% stake	Growing competition in flu vaccine market declining market share
	Significant operational and investment hurdles to meet targets and expectations
4	

#### \$45 Per Share is a Full Offer

Well above Novartis view on the stand-alone value (USD 34.75 per share)

In excess of Wall Street target prices

Compares favorably to key valuation benchmarks

Offer value allocates more than 70% - beyond fair share to non-Novartis shareholders (USD 8.40 per share)

## Agenda

Introduction

An Opportunity for Growth but Not Without Risks

\$45 Per Share is a Full Value

#### **Chiron Has Mid- and Long-Term Opportunities**

Vaccines Blood testing BioPharmaceuticals

Flu NAT: HIV, HCV, HBV, WNV Cystic fibrosis

Skin / renal cancer

Meningococcus C Immunoassays:

HIV, HCV Multiple sclerosis

Travel Procleix Ultrio (US) Specialty antibiotics

Pediatrics Molecular diagnostics Oncology

Meningococcus B, ACWY

Therapeutic vaccines, cancer vaccines

Marketed products

Pipeline

Long-term opportunities

<b>But Many</b>	<b>Issues</b>	Remain	Unreso	lved
-----------------	---------------	--------	--------	------

Ongo	oing rei	nediation	at Liv	erpool.	Marburg	and	Siena	facilities
OIIS	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	ncananon	ut 111	cipooi,	mulations	unu	Sicila	ideliffics

Open FDA 483 issues in Liverpool, Marburg and Emeryville

Ongoing sterility issues in Marburg facility prevented BEGRIVAC vaccine supply for 2005-2006 and may delay cell flu program

High risk, early-stage pipeline

Ongoing legal issues and distractions relating to the disclosure of Chiron s manufacturing problems in 2004

#### Remediation of Manufacturing Sites is Ongoing and Will Take Time and Capital to Complete

**Liverpool** Further investments needed

1960s facility requires environmental upgrades, air handling and water systems

improvements

Marburg Remediation ongoing

Substandard engineering

Improvement in flu cell culture facility design needed

Siena Past maintenance minimised catch-up needed to ensure ongoing critical operations

Emeryville Ongoing upgrades required for BioPharma and Blood Testing

Incremental remediation Capex through 2010 to reach \$200m

## The Biopharmaceuticals Pipeline is High Risk and Dependent on the Success of Tifacogin

Product	Phase	Earliest launch	Peak les(1)	PoS(1)	Comments
PULMINIQ	Registr	NA	\$ 50m	50%	Approvable letter ; further clinical studies required but not planned
Tifacogin	Phase III	2008	\$ 750m	25%	OPTIMIST Phase III trial in 1,754 patients failed
Tobramycin DPI	Phase III	2009	\$ 64m(2)	70%	Significant technical risks/hurdles
CHIR 258	Phase I	2010	\$ 300m	10%	Early stage
CHIR 12.12	Phase I	2010	\$ 300m	10%	Early stage
CHIR 265	Preclinical	NA	NA	NA	Early stage

(1) Source: Lehman Brothers, PharmaPipelines, October 2005

(2) These are incremental sales beyond peak sales estimate for TOBI, as these will be cannibalised

#### and Tifacogin s Success Remains Questionable

Tifacogin failed a Phase III study to measure efficacy and safety in 1,754 patients with severe sepsis no survival benefit vs placebo on the primary endpoint (mortality at 28 days) and on all pre-specified sub-group analyses

safety issues, particularly CNS bleeds, were more frequent with tifacogin than with other anticoagulants (e.g. heparin)

In one *retrospective* sub-group analysis of 157 patients (sCAP patients with documented bacterial infection and <u>not treated with heparin</u>) tifacogin showed a benefit vs placebo

However, other tifacogin treated sub-groups showed a trend to greater mortality, including sCAP patients not treated with heparin <u>without</u> documented evidence of infection

Even if successful in showing benefit in this sCAP population in the ongoing study, commercial prospects are likely to be limited

Only 30% of sCAP patients don t receive heparin

56 000 patients / year in the US(1)

(1) Am J Resp & Crit Care Med 165:766 (2002)

Whilst the Vaccine Market is an Attractive Growth Platform

Innovative vaccines for established and novel targets, including therapeutic vaccines
New opportunities through break-through technologies (e.g. recombinant vaccines)
Increasing awareness of the potential of vaccines to reduce health care burden
Improving pricing and funding
Global vaccine market (\$ bn)
[CHART]
Source: Historical data based on annual reports and equity research. 2009 based on average growth projections by Evaluate Pharma, IMS, Deutsche Bank, West LB and Datamonitor
12

## Chiron Has Under-Invested in Vaccines R&D Resulting in a Smaller Late Stage Portfolio

2004A Chiron R&D spend (\$ m)  [CHART]
[CHART]
2004A vaccine companies R&D spend (\$ m)
[CHART]
Current Phase II & III vaccine products
[CHART]
Source: Company filings and equity research
1: Based on GSK s indication that vaccine R&D spend is in-line with overall Ph
13

## as a Result Chiron Lacks Projects in Major Growth Areas

#### Blockbuster vaccine launches 2000-2010

Product	Indication	Projected peak sales (\$ m)	Projected launch
Gardasil (Merck)	HPV	[CHART]	2006
Prevnar (Wyeth)	Pneumococcus		2000
Cervarix (GSK)	HPV		2007
Streptarix (GSK)	Pneumococcus		2009
Gardasil (Sanofi)	HPV		2008
Rotarix (GSK)	Rotavirus		2006
Rotateq (Merck)	Rotavirus		2006

Source: Peak sales estimates and launch dates are per Lehman Pharma Pipeline

In Addition Competition is Increasing Capacity in Chiron s Key Franchise - Flu Vaccines
Planned capacity of main players
[CHART]
Market evolving from a duopoly to five strong suppliers
Expected total capacity of approximately 280 m doses in 2009 equal to the US population
A general vaccination recommendation will be needed to avoid oversupply
Source: Data presented at the National Influenza Summit 2006 and company announcements

#### Pandemics Continue to Be a Threat to Public Health with a Potential Unmet Need

Influenza A subtypes in the human population

Strain		H1N1				H1N1		
		=>	H2N2			=>		
	H3 ?	(Spanish flu)	=>			(re-emerged)		
	=>		(Asian fl	u)				
				I	H3N2			
				=	=>		H5N1	
							=>	
							(bird flu)	
	1900	1920	1940		1960	1980	2000	
Impact	Unknown	40 m deaths		>1 m		>1 m	>1 m	?
		world wide		deaths		deaths	deaths	
				world wid	le	world wide	world wide	

Source: Adapted from Palese, Nature Medicine, 10(12): S82-S87 (2004); CDC

but Histor	v Teaches	Us That	They May	Not Necessaril	v Materialize

1976 - swine flu

February: Influenza A Hsw1N1 strain caused severe respiratory illness in 13 soldiers with one death in Fort Dix, NJ

Summer: Initial vaccination campaign foreseen to target 150 m patients only 43 m were actually vaccinated

December: Epidemic viewed as unlikely by Center for Disease Control (CDC), campaign stopped

#### And in the Event of an Avian Flu Pandemic There May Be Little Commercial Value

Regulatory pathway still needs to be clarified with different Governments focusing on different specifications

The strain may still mutate making existing products obsolete. As such, there is unclear pricing and stockpiling needs

Production of H5N1 has low yields and will cannibalize existing flu vaccine capacity today only small quantities are produced in the winter

Twelve companies are involved in the development of a H5N1 vaccine with five phase II programs and over 20 earlier stage programs ongoing

History suggests that a real pandemic will most likely require an altruistic approach by industry - which can only be funded by larger companies

## The Status Quo is Less Attractive Than Novartis Offer

Overstretched across three different business units, all of which are sub critical in size
Underinvestment in Vaccines and Diagnostics
Suboptimal R&D output from BioPharma
Business is highly dependent on royalties
Investment requirement cannot be sustained
Over \$ 600 m in capex required in vaccines by 2010(1)
Stand-Alone case is highly dependent on tifacogin, which has a low probability of success
A stronger international sales and marketing platform will be required to realize Chiron s pipeline potential
1) Estimated capex need including investment in flu cell culture
19

Agenda	
	Introduction
	An Opportunity for Growth but Not Without Risks
	\$45 Per Share is a Full Value
	20

#### **An Uninspiring Investment Since 1994**

From Novartis initial investment to offer

[CHART]

Source: Factset

# **Near-Term Management Forecasts Are Below Wall Street Expectations, Long-Term Forecasts Are Very Aggressive**

Revenue (\$bn) Net Income (\$m)

[CHART] [CHART]

Note: 2005A Net Income adjusted for normalized tax rate of 25.0%

Chiron s management projections underlying Chiron s valuation analysis

#### **Business is Dependent on Royalties**

Chiron royalties provide only short-term cash flow and flatter Chiron s valuation parameters

Significant patent expiries from 2008 onwards

Chiron projected royalty revenue		2005 adjusted P&L	
	( <b>\$m</b> )	Adj. Incl. Royalties	Excluding Royalties
[CHART]	Revenues	1,920	1,603
	Gross Profit	1,189	871
	Operating Profit	232	(85)
	Adj. Net Income	214	(24)
	EPS (\$)	1.11	(0.13)

Note: Adjusted net income assuming recurring 25% tax rate

Net income from royalties tax effected at a 25% tax rate

23

Implied P/E at \$45

NM

40.5x

# \$45 Offer Grants More Than $70\,\%$ of Synergy Value to non-NVS Shareholders

Methodology	Value per share (\$)	Comments
52-Week Trading Range	[CHART]	Trading Range post Fluvirin announcement: \$30.80-38.63
		Average prices: \$36.23 / 36.12 (3M/6M)
Research Target Prices		Target prices published prior to 31-Aug offer
		Consensus recommendation: Hold
		Outliers excluded
DCF Standalone		Sum-of-parts DCF
Standarone		10% discount rate
		Sensitivity is a range of 3.5% - 4.5% terminal growth rate for Fluvirin
DCF with 50% Synergies		Standalone DCF plus 50% of expected synergy value over all outstanding shares
DCF with 100% Synergies		Standalone DCF plus 100% of expected synergy value over all outstanding shares
Source: Goldman Sachs analysis filed i	n the 13E-3	
		24

#### **Limited Upcoming Share Price Catalysts**

Chiron delayed negotiations for 11 months to capture positive newsflow during discussions

First contact December 2004

Negotiations ended October 2005

Newsflow incorporated in price

Re-entry to U.S. flu market

First Phase 3 trial in EU for flu cell culture

Initiation of Phase 1 / Phase 2 in U.S. for flu cell culture

Positive data on MF59 adjuvant with potential pandemic strain

Initiation of Phase 3 for TIP

Initiation of Phase 1 for CHIR-12.12

Geographic expansion and ex. U.S. PROCLEIX ULTRIO penetration

Limited upcoming newsflow left

#### Wall Street Analysts See Few Remaining Growth Drivers and Have Price Targets Below \$ 45

Pre-offer views	Post-offer views

We see few remaining growth drivers over the next 12 18 months () as the flu vaccine business comes under significant pressure from competition (Morgan Stanley, 31-Aug-2005)	Thus, we believe Chiron shareholders would get more value and reduce risk through an all-cash acquisition by Novartis than if existing management continued to run the business (Merrill Lynch, 06-Sep-2005)
In our opinion, <b>Chiron lacks depth in regards to a product pipeline</b> in comparison to its peer group () ( <i>Citigroup, 27-Jul-2005</i> )	We believe it is unlikely that there will be other offers/bidders and recommend taking profits at or above our target price of \$42 per share (Citigroup, 01-Sep-2005)
We believe the <b>continued funding</b> of further development of Proleukin, as well as resurrected programs such as Tifacogin, and attempts at diversification in the testing business, <b>will fail to bear fruit</b> (Bernstein, 28-Jul-2005)	Our sum-of-the-parts valuation suggests that the company is <b>fairly</b> valued with a range of \$37-\$44 per share (AG Edwards, 02-Sep-2005)

Source: Wall Street research

a1	lusion
Canci	noisin
COLLE	usion

Chiron is overstretched in all three businesses

Stand-alone option is not in the best shareholder interest

Novartis is offering a full and fair price

No significant value-driving milestone in the near term

Turnaround period of 3-5 years